There are probably a lot more pragmatists than there are philosophers who self-identify as such. Anecdotally, we have noticed some occasional reluctance or resistance to the label. Based on our many years of experience in philosophy, this reluctance often stems from understandable, if misguided, preconceptions about pragmatism. In particular, there is a widespread misconception that to be a pragmatist, one must subscribe to some fairly extreme or unpopular views, e.g., some sort of globalized anti-realism, relativism, or quietism. While some pragmatists undoubtedly endorse such views, there are just as many, perhaps more, who do not. Many pragmatists embrace relatively conventional views on these topics, including correspondence theories of truth and relatively strong forms of realism (albeit realism of a novel variety). In short, if you are reading this, then we think there is every chance you’re a pragmatist, but you haven’t realized it yet.
1. Stereotypical Pragmatism
The widespread impression of what makes someone a philosophical pragmatist is that they satisfy one or more of the following descriptions:
A historian of philosophy who works on Peirce, James, Addams, and Dewey, and/or philosophers influenced by them (e.g. Putnam, Rorty, Brandom, Kitcher, Misak, etc.)
Someone working on realism or truth who endorses the pragmatist conception of truth or some sort of global anti-realism or relativism
Philosophers who consider all metaphysics to be pointless or meaningless
Someone who thinks “meaning is use” and thus approaches many (especially language-related) issues in a broadly later-Wittgensteinean fashion, who embraces inferentialism, etc.
While satisfying one or more of these descriptions may be sufficient, it is certainly not necessary to identify with the label ‘pragmatist.’ This is because pragmatism is and always has been a much broader, more diverse philosophical tradition than this. The canonical figures (along with those unjustly excluded from that canon) also disagreed with one another on lots of things, including issues mentioned in the above list.
[For a short, highly accessible summary of some of the main aspects of the Classical pragmatists' "family feud", check out this recent chapter by Henry Jackman (which appears in the excellent, recently published Routledge Companion to Pragmatism, 2022).] 2. Pragmatism as Methodological What the historical pragmatists shared in common was something more like a methodological disposition or tendency to insist on practice as a touchstone for philosophical theorizing. This tendency gave rise to a complex and diverse philosophical tradition rather than any single, definitive set of substantive doctrines. Some of the most vociferous and long-standing disagreements among pragmatists concern what, if anything, follows from a commitment to pragmatist methodology. 3. Pragmatism a la carte Thus, in hopes of encouraging a wider range of people to explore their interest in and relationship to pragmatism, this post provides what we hope is a better, broader range of claims associated with it (though we emphasize, this is by no means an exhaustive list - your suggestions for additions are welcome, in fact). Along with each claim, we’ve provided links to various texts, usually one canonical/classical one and one more contemporary one. Many of the more recent texts are by authors you may not normally associate with pragmatism, to illustrate our overarching theme. Some agree with or advance pragmatist claims; some critique them. We've tried to favor free versions of texts where possible, but many links are to papers that may be behind a paywall and/or only accessible through a university library.
Belief: beliefs are at least partly constituted by habits of action and/or properly individuated in terms of practical dispositions; [Peirce (Fixation); Zimmerman]
Conceptual clarification: the best way to clarify concepts is by reference to their actual and possible practical consequences; [Peirce (Ideas); Brandom]
Inquiry: inquiry is a process that begins with doubt or indeterminacy generated by recalcitrant experience and terminates in a settled, stable, or ‘fixed’ belief (ideally an indefeasible one) and/or a unified, determinate situation; [Re: Dewey on SEP; Friedman]
Anti-Cartesianism: there are no infallible ‘intuitions’; the bare possibility of error is insufficient to generate genuine doubt or initiate genuine inquiry; philosophy cannot begin with or ever achieve perfect certainty; philosophical inquiry should not rely solely or primarily on deductive reasoning, etc. [Peirce's two classic papers ; Hookway]
Experience: the early modern philosophers’ understanding of ‘experience’ is impoverished since it leaves out (e.g.) direct experience of necessity (in diagrammatic reasoning), experience of relations, etc. [James (Essays in Radical Empiricism); Giannotta]
Ethics of Belief: given that beliefs are (at least partly) habits of action and that our actions affect others, we have an ethical duty to ensure our beliefs are supported by adequate evidence; vs. given that sometimes we must act in the absence of sufficient evidence, we therefore sometimes have the right to believe without sufficient evidence [Clifford vs. James; Aikin; Basu]
Peircean truth: the truth of p is at least partly constituted by whether or not p would be believed at the end of inquiry; [Peirce in Baldwin's Dictionary; Wright]
Jamesian truth: the truth of p (in at least some contexts) is at least partly constituted by the practical benefits of belief in p; [James; Medina]
Pragmatic encroachment: non-evidential considerations can contribute to holding a belief’s being epistemically or morally permissible (or both); [Haack; Fantl & McGrath]
Pragmatic Realism: metaphysical realism (e.g., the idea that there are ‘things in themselves’ that our true beliefs represent) is false; [Putnam bibliography on PhilPapers]
Representational Pluralism: the idea of a single, privileged conceptual scheme that ‘carves nature at the joints’ is incoherent or indefensible [Goodman; Bélanger (ed.); Chang; Henne]
Religious, Moral, Political, and/or Philosophical Pluralism: the idea that in at least some domains, it is wrong, harmful, pointless, or at least unjustified to assume that rational inquiry can or should produce a single true answer to a given question that any rational inquirer ought to accept. [Cooke; Aikin & Talisse; Jackman]
Critical common-sensism: one can be both anti-skeptical and a fallibilist*. [Hookway; Hannon]
Fact/Value: there is no fundamental dichotomy between fact and value (i.e. an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between descriptive and normative propositions). [Putnam; Bergström]
Meaning: in some philosophically important sense, “meaning is use”. [Boncompagni; Keiser]
Inferentialism: inferential role is explanatorily prior to representational content [Brandom; Salmon; Peregrin]
*This is not quite what Peirce meant by the term ‘critical common-sensism’, but is likely entailed by that view. This is also the claim Hilary Putnam claimed is most essential to pragmatism in his "Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity" (1994, in the collection Words and Life). 4. Our Mission As an organization, the SoCal Pragmatist Forum seeks out and welcomes all scholars from all disciplines interested in or curious about these kinds of claims. Our goal is not to convince you to self-identify as a “pragmatist” nor to endorse any of these claims. Our goal is simply to foster and encourage fruitful philosophical discussion about these and related claims, about the thinkers who have argued for (and against) them, and about the history and the dialectic of debates about them. We hope participating in those discussions will give you a deeper appreciation of the depth and richness of the pragmatist tradition, regardless of how you describe your scholarship.
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